The Dynamics of Carbon Sequestration and Alternative Carbon Accounting, with an Application to the Upper Mississippi River Basin by Feng, Hongli
CARD Working Papers CARD Reports and Working Papers
3-2005
The Dynamics of Carbon Sequestration and
Alternative Carbon Accounting, with an
Application to the Upper Mississippi River Basin
Hongli Feng
Iowa State University, hfeng@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Economics Commons, Natural
Resource Economics Commons, and the Natural Resources and Conservation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CARD Reports and Working Papers at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in CARD Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Feng, Hongli, "The Dynamics of Carbon Sequestration and Alternative Carbon Accounting, with an Application to the Upper
Mississippi River Basin" (2005). CARD Working Papers. 382.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/382
The Dynamics of Carbon Sequestration and Alternative Carbon
Accounting, with an Application to the Upper Mississippi River Basin
Abstract
Carbon sequestration is a temporal process in which carbon is continuously being stored/released over time.
Different methods of carbon accounting can be used to account for this temporal nature, including annual
average carbon, annualized carbon, and ton-year carbon. In this paper, starting by exposing the underlying
connections among these methods, we examine how the comparisons of sequestration projects are affected by
these methods and the major factors affecting them. We explore the empirical implications for carbon
sequestration policies by applying these accounting methods to the Upper Mississippi River Basin, a large and
important agriculture area in the United States. We find that the differences are significant in terms of the
location of land that might be chosen and the distribution of carbon sequestration over the area, although the
total amount of carbon sequestered does not differ considerably across programs that use different accounting
methods or different values of the major factors.
Keywords
annual average carbon, annualized carbon, carbon sequestration, ton-year carbon
Disciplines
Agricultural and Resource Economics | Economics | Natural Resource Economics | Natural Resources and
Conservation
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/382
The Dynamics of Carbon Sequestration and Alternative Carbon
Accounting, with an Application to the Upper Mississippi River Basin
Hongli Feng
Working Paper 05-WP 386
March 2005
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa 50011-1070
www.card.iastate.edu
Hongli Feng is an associate scientist at the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State
University.
This paper is available online on the CARD Web site: www.card.iastate.edu. Permission is granted to
reproduce this information with appropriate attribution to the author.
For questions or comments about the contents of this paper, please contact Hongli Feng, 560D Heady
Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011-1070; Ph: 515-294-6307; Fax: 515-294-6336; E-mail:
hfeng@iastate.edu.
Iowa State University does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, age, religion, national origin, sexual
orientation, sex, marital status, disability, or status as a U.S. Vietnam Era Veteran. Any persons having inquiries
concerning this may contact the Director of Equal Opportunity and Diversity, 1350 Beardshear Hall, 515-294-7612.
The Dynamics of Carbon Sequestration and Alternative Carbon
Accounting, with an Application to the Upper Mississippi River Basin
Abstract: Carbon sequestration is a temporal process in which carbon is con-
tinuously being stored/released over a period of time. Dierent methods of carbon
accounting can be used to account for this temporal nature, including annual average
carbon, annualized carbon, and ton-year carbon. In this paper, starting by exposing
the underlying connections among these methods, we examine how the comparisons
of sequestration projects are aected by these methods and the major factors aect-
ing them. We explore the empirical implications for carbon sequestration policies by
applying these accounting methods to the Upper Mississippi River Basin, a large and
important agriculture area in the United States. We nd that the dierences are sig-
nicant in terms of the location of land that might be chosen and the distribution of
carbon sequestration over the area, although the total amount of carbon sequestered
does not dier considerably across programs that use dierent accounting methods
or dierent values of the major factors.
Keywords: annual average carbon, annualized carbon, carbon sequestration,
ton-year carbon.
JEL Classication: Q20, Q25
1 Introduction
Carbon sequestration through land use changes and forestry has been the focus
of considerable attention in the climate change literature because of its potential as
a cost-eective mitigation strategy. With the Kyoto Protocol becoming a binding
treaty, countries may have further incentives to incorporate it into their greenhouse
gas management plans. Carbon sequestration is a temporal process that removes
carbon from the atmosphere either evenly or unevenly over time: the amount of
carbon removal is larger in some periods than in others. Negative sequestration,
that is, carbon release into the atmosphere is also possible over some time intervals
even though a project has overall positive sequestration. In order to properly assess
dierent sequestration projects, it is critical that this temporal attribute be properly
accounted for. In this paper, we examine some of the important issues related to
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carbon accounting and its policy implications when sequestration becomes part of
the climate change mitigation portfolio.
In reporting the amount of carbon that has been sequestered in a project, sev-
eral accounting methods and their variations have been used or proposed in the
literature, including the annual average carbon, the annualized carbon, and ton-year
carbon. Simply speaking, the annual average carbon, the most widely used account-
ing method, is the sum of total carbon sequestered over a xed period of time divided
by the length of the period. To reect our preference for benets that have occurred
earlier, the annualized carbon accounting method discounts carbon sequestered later.
Although new relative to annual average carbon, annualized carbon (or its variation,
the present discounted value of carbon) has been employed by many studies, including
Adams et al. (1999), Plantinga et al. (1999), and Stavins (1999). A third accounting
method, the ton-year carbon, takes into account the duration of carbon kept out-
side of the atmosphere. Several studies (e.g., Watson et al., 2000; Moura-Costa and
Wilson, 2000) have analyzed this method with an emphasis on how it facilitates the
comparison among projects that sequester (or release) carbon for dierent lengths of
time.
Dierent projects may show up as the favorable choices when dierent accounting
methods are used. Even under the same accounting method, the ranking of projects
may dier, as the value of some factors varies. The rst factor is the project duration.
There might be some natural choices for the value of this factor, for example, the
saturation point, which is the length of time needed for a carbon pool to reach
equilibrium. Given that there may be dierent carbon pools in a single project (let
alone in multiple projects), the use of saturation point may result in (a) dierent
durations in dierent projects and (b) a somewhat subjective decision on which, if
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any, carbon pool's saturation point to use. In fact, dierent durations of projects have
been employed in the literature to suit the underlying nature of the analyses. For
example, Stavins (1999) used a period of 90 years to allow at least one rotation of each
project species; Parks and Hardie (1995) limited their study to the life of a temperate
forest; and Adams et al. (1999) chose a 50-year period to investigate the costs of
sequestration through both aorestation and improvement in forest management.
The eect of the choice of project durations is largely determined by the path of
a sequestration project (i.e., distribution of carbon sequestration over time), which
is the second factor we are going to explore. Obviously, an accounting method that
gives more weight to early sequestration will favor a project that sequesters carbon
in relatively early periods. Although seldom discussed in the literature on the cost of
sequestration, the eects of dierent mitigation paths have been extensively debated
in the more general climatic change literature (see Wigley et al., 1996 and Ramakr-
ishna, 1997). Some have argued that delaying abatement may be costly because there
is socioeconomic inertia in the energy system and the process of climate change is
dicult to reverse. If earlier carbon sequestration is valued more, then we may prefer
one sequestration project over another even if both projects can sequester the same
amount of carbon (undiscounted sum) at the same amount of cost over the same
period of time. To take into account the timing of carbon uptake, discounting can
be used.
The discount rate is the third factor that we are going to discuss. Instead of
sensitivity-type analysis, we examine how the discount rate interacts with sequestra-
tion paths and project durations to aect the results of sequestration policies. The
advantage of discounting is that it can reect preferences for early carbon reduction
and allow us to focus on some summary measures (e.g., annualized carbon) without
3
being too concerned about the paths of sequestration. However, discounting also
brings its own complications because, as we illustrate, a dierent discount rate may
favor a dierent sequestration activity and, even at the same discount rate, dierent
projects may become the favorable choice as project durations vary.
Some studies have started investigating the issue of accounting for time in climate
mitigation through carbon sequestration. The dierences of alternative accounting
methods and the factors aecting them are discussed in the special report on Land
Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) (Watson et al., 2000, Chapters 2 and 5). Fearnside et al. (2000)
indicated that temporal issues will be key factors in determining whether eorts to
mitigate global warming will include carbon sinks and which sequestration activities
should be given priority. They identied ton-year carbon accounting as a mechanism
to compare sequestration of dierent durations. They also showed that discounting
can strongly inuence economic decisions. Tipper and De Jong (1998) carefully
described the accounting methods that we analyze in this paper and discussed their
advantages and disadvantages. They also applied their discussions to a project in
Mexico.
Building on previous research, we contribute to the literature by (i) investigating
how the comparisons of the accounting methods are aected by three factors (project
durations, discount rate, and carbon sequestration paths) and how the factors interact
with each other, and (ii) applying the analysis to a major agricultural area in the
United States and demonstrating the dierent outcomes of policies based on dierent
accounting methods or dierent values of the factors. We start by describing the
accounting methods and their underlying connections in the next section. Then in
sections 3-4 we analyze the eects of the three factors. The empirical application is
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provided in section 5. The last section gives concluding comments.
2 The alternative accounting methods
In order to understand the underlying connections between the accounting meth-
ods, we begin with the following framework. Consider a program with a funding of
M; which selectively enrolls elds from a total of N agricultural or forest elds to
sequester carbon from time 0 to time T: We call T the project duration. Each piece
of land is enrolled for some carbon sequestration practices during this period of time.
The size of eld n is denoted as An; where n is the index of a eld. Carbon sequestered
at time t by a unit of land on eld n is denoted as xn(t)  0: Denote the cost of
enrolling a unit of land from eld n as pn(t); which is the prot forgone and/or estab-
lishment expenditures due to the adoption of carbon sequestration activities. Given
that our focus is on carbon accounting, for simplicity we assume that the benet of
carbon sequestration for mitigating climate change is constant over time, denoted as
b for any t for each unit of carbon sequestered.
Suppose the policymaker's problem is to choose an for each eld to maximize the
present discounted value (PDV) of the benet from sequestration over the project
duration, i.e.,
max
an
NX
n=1
Z T
0
Z T
t
b  an  xn(t)  e rsdsdt (1a)
s:t:
NX
n=1
an
Z T
0
e rtpn(t)dt =M; (1b)
0  an  An; (1c)
where r is the discount rate for the policymaker. In the objective function, the inner
integration represents the overall benet from the carbon sequestrated at time t in
eld n. The benet starts accruing from the time of sequestration (t) and lasts
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until the end of the project duration (T ). The outer integration essentially sums
up the benet of carbon sequestered at each point of time over [0; T ]. The budget
constraint, (1b), indicates that the total payment over [0; T ] for all enrolled elds
is equal to the available funding.1 It is important to note here that all enrollment
occurs at time 0 and an does not change with time. Because of the reversibility of
carbon sequestration, it is important for a policy to enroll a farmer for a relatively
long period of time. Also for the same reason of non-permanence, it is important to
take into account the duration of benets from sequestration.
Using  as the multiplier for the budget constraint, the solutions to (1) can be
written as follows:
an =
8<:
An
0
a
9=; if bXn
8<:
>
<
=
9=; 
Z T
0
e rtpn(t)dt; (2)
where Xn 
Z T
0
xn(t)
Z T
t
e rsdsdt; and (3)
a =

M  Pfi: ai=Aig ai R T0 e rtpi(t)dt.R T0 e rtpn(t)dt : Intuitively,  is the shadow
cost of funding. The left-hand side of the conditions in (2) represents the total PDV
of benet from eld n; while the right-hand side represents the PDV of costs from
eld n for carbon sequestration over the project duration. Whether to enroll eld n
depends on whether the PDV of benet is greater than the PDV of cost. If benet is
less than cost, then the eld will not be enrolled. On the contrary, a whole eld will
be enrolled if its benet is greater than the corresponding cost. When benet and
cost are equal for a eld, the area enrolled from the eld (a) is determined by the
price of enrolling the parcel and the funding left after payment for all other parcels
with whole-eld enrollment.
The term Xn can be considered as a measure of total carbon accumulated on
1Another form of resource constraint is the total available land. However, our discussions would
mostly stay the same with the use of this constraint.
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one unit of eld n. In empirical analysis, several important simplications of Xn
are often used, including the sum of carbon, the PDV of carbon, and the ton-year
carbon. By dividing a constant (some variation of the length of time), these measures
are equivalent to annual average carbon, annualized carbon, and the average ton-year
carbon, respectively. We will next dene these terms, show their connections with
Xn; and highlight the assumptions under each of these measures.
Denition 1 The sum of carbon sequestration in a unit of land on eld n ( Xn) is
the simple summation of carbon sequestered over [0; T ]; and annual average carbon
(xn) is the sum of carbon sequestered divided by the corresponding period of time;
that is,
Xn 
Z T
0
xn(t)dt; and xn 
Xn
T
: (4)
Comparing Xn and Xn; we know that the latter is derived by setting r = 0 and
assuming that carbon sequestered at time t only has eect at time t (as opposed to
over the period from t to T ): Thus, the sum of carbon does not take into account
the fact that, relative to carbon sequestered later, carbon sequestered earlier provides
earlier benet that is usually valued more and provides benet for a longer duration.
Denition 2 The present discounted value of carbon sequestration in a unit of land
on eld n (X^n) is the sum of carbon sequestered over [0; T ] weighted by a discounting
term, e rt; and the annualized carbon (x^n) is a constant equal for all time points
such that the PDV of this constant is equal to X^n; that is,
X^n 
Z T
0
e rtxn(t)dt; and x^n  X^nR T
0 e
 rtdt
: (5)
Setting r = 0 in X^n, we have X^n = Xn: Also, if we assume that carbon se-
questered at time t only has eect at time t; then Xn = X^n. It may seem unusual
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to use the PDV of a physical good, carbon, because PDVs are in general calculated
for monetary values. In fact, in the model setup (1), only monetary values are dis-
counted. Carbon discounting results from the discounting of the benet provided by
future sequestration.
Denition 3 The ton-year carbon sequestration in a unit of land on eld n ( ~Xn) is
the sum of carbon sequestered over [0; T ] weighted by the length of the period lasting
from the time carbon is sequestered until the end of the project duration,2 and average
ton-year carbon (~xn) is a constant equal for all time points such that the ton-year
carbon of this constant is equal to ~Xn; that is,
~Xn 
Z T
0
Z T
t
xn(t)dsdt; and ~xn =
~XnR T
0
R T
t 1dsdt
: (6)
It is easy to see that the only dierence between ~Xn and Xn is the discounting
factor: specically, in the former, r is set to 0: One dierence between ~Xn and X^n (or
Xn) is that the former takes into account the duration of benet while the latter does
not. It is interesting to note that some researchers have proposed a conversion factor
between 1 ton-year carbon of sequestration and 1 ton of carbon emission reduction,
which is estimated to be about 0.0182 (Moura-Costa and Wilson, 2000; and Tipper
and De Jong, 1998).
From their denitions, it is clear that the accounting methods can be very dif-
ferent mainly due to some factors: r; T; and xn(t). The sequestration path, xn(t), is
given for a xed eld with specied land use practices except for variations caused
by natural uncertainties. As we discussed in the introduction, the choice of T is
not as obvious as it rst appears. When projects have dierent sequestration paths,
the choice of r and T may aect the ranking of projects no matter which carbon
2Although in our analysis ton-year carbon does not incorporate discounting, one might modify
the approach to include discounting.
8
accounting method is used. As a result, dierent projects may be included in carbon
sequestration policies, which in turn may aect the overall outcome of policies.
3 The eects of discounting under dierent carbon paths
If carbon sequestration is linear (i.e., constant over time), say, xn(t) = x; then it
is easy to show that all three accounting methods will be equivalent in the sense that
the annual average carbon, the annualized carbon, and the average ton-year carbon
will have exactly the same value. In such cases, the choice of projects is not aected
by the choice of accounting methods. However, carbon sequestration is usually non-
linear. For example, carbon sequestration by aorestation is largely determined by
the accumulation of biomass, which is generally known to be slow at the beginning,
faster in the midterm, and then slow again near maturity. The duration of each stage
could range from a few years to more than a hundred years, depending on the timber
species. Two examples are illustrated in Figure 1, which is based on Richards et
al. (1993). A similar process also exists for carbon sequestration by switching from
conventional tillage to conservation tillage (Lal et al., 1998).
When linearity is not satised, two elds may have quite dierent annualized
carbon even if they have the same undiscounted annual averages of carbon and the
same r and T are used. In other words, x^n  x^m may be large in absolute value even
if xn   xm is zero. The disparity between x^n   x^m and xn   xm is aected by the
curvature of xn(t) and xm(t), since x^n and x^m discount later sequestration while xn
and xm do not. If we view carbon sequestration xn(t) as the weight attached to the
corresponding time t; then xn(t); upon appropriate normalization, can be viewed as
the probability density function of t. This view of xn(t) enables utilization of well-
known results in the literature on nance and risk. Before invoking any result, we
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present the denitions of two concepts.
Denition 4 Let F i(y) and F j(y) be two cumulative distribution functions (cdf's) of
a random variable y 2 y

; y

: (i) F i(y) rst-order stochastically dominates (FOSD)
F j(y) if Z y
y

(y)dF i(y) 
Z y
y

(y)dF j(y) (7)
for any non-decreasing function (y): (ii) F i(y) second-order stochastically dominates
(SOSD) F j(y) if (7) holds for any non-decreasing concave function (y):
We can show that F i(y) FOSD F j(y) if F i(y)  F j(y); for any y 2 y

; y

:
Also, given the same mean, if Y has larger variability under F j(y) than under F i(y)
then F i(y) SOSD F j(y): Loosely speaking, FOSD compares the means (levels) of
two distributions while SOSD, in addition, compares their spread over the domain
of a random variable. Suppose the two cdf's are the distributions of random net
returns associated with two investment projects. If F i(y) FOSD F j(y); that is, higher
returns are more likely to occur under F i(y) than under F j(y); then the former will
be preferred over the latter by any investor who values higher returns more. If F i(y)
SOSD F j(y); then the former will be preferred over the latter by risk-averse investors
because net returns from the former tend to be less variable and/or higher in all
states of nature.
In our context, we can construct a cdf as follows. Dene
F i(t) =
R t
0 xi(s)dsR T
0 xi(s)ds
; i = 1; 2; :::; N: (8)
Although F i(t) satises all the conditions required for a cdf, dierent probability
densities are only articially attached to dierent values of t since t is not a random
variable. Based on F i(t), we next provide a proposition on the comparison of carbon
paths based on annual average carbon and annualized carbon.
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Proposition 1 Given xn = xm; if F
m(t) rst-order stochastically dominates Fn(t)
then x^n  x^m for any r > 0; if Fm(t) second-order stochastically dominates Fn(t),
then x^n  x^m for r > 0:3
A proof is given in the appendix. Intuitively, the probability density articially
given to each value of t is determined by the rate of carbon sequestration. The
rst-order stochastic dominance by Fm(t) over Fn(t) means that proportionally less
carbon is accumulated earlier under path xm(t) than under path xn(t): Given that
earlier sequestration is valued more (for r > 0) in calculating the PDV of a stream
of carbon sequestration, the PDV is greater from xn(t) than from xm(t); that is,
X^n  X^m; or equivalently, x^n  x^m:
For the paths given in Figure 1, the two pines have about the same annual
average carbon, 2.15 tons/year/acre, for the period from year 0 to year 77. Then
based on the curvature of the two paths, it is easy to see that Fm(t) rst-order
stochastically dominates Fn(t) for the same period. So x^n  x^m for any r > 0 by
Proposition 1. In fact, for the same period and at a 2 percent discount rate, the
annualized carbon sequestration for loblolly and ponderosa pines are x^n = 2:62 and
x^m = 1:84 tons/year/acre, respectively. The dierence between x^n  x^m and xn  xm
is about 0:78 tons/year/acre, which accounts for 36 percent of the annual average
carbon sequestration.
When there is no FOSD relationship between Fm(t) and Fn(t); the rst half
of Proposition 1 does not apply. However, if we know that Fm(t) SOSD Fn(t);
then we can invoke the second half of the proposition. Graphically, the second-order
stochastic dominance of Fm(t) over Fn(t) implies that carbon uptake spreads out
3From their denitions, it is clear that FOSD implies SOSD. That is, if Fm(t) FOSD Fn(t); then
Fm(t) SOSD Fn(t): Thus, the rst part of the proposition is captured in the second part of the
proposition. Both are presented here to facilitate discussion.
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more evenly over time and/or occurs earlier along path xn(t) than along path xm(t)
(see Figure 2). Because of discounting, the value of carbon sequestration decreases at
an exponential rate, e rt, and so the annualized carbon is higher for a carbon path
with relatively more early carbon sequestration. Thus, we have x^n  x^m:
It is important to note that Proposition 1 only applies to some carbon paths
since FOSD and SOSD do not completely characterize the relationship between two
cdf's. It may happen that neither cdf dominates the other in terms of FOSD or
SOSD. In these situations, the comparisons of accounting methods and carbon paths
will be more complicated, as illustrated by the following section.
4 The eects of T, r, and carbon sequestration path
In this section, we will explore by illustration how T , r, and sequestration paths
aect the accounting methods, focusing on how the comparisons of the accounting
methods might be aected by the factors and how the eects of one factor might
be inuenced by another factor. Tables (1a) and (1b) show annualized carbon se-
questration (x^n) in an acre of aorestation for two species of pines with dierent r
and T. The rst row of the tables (with r = 0) indicates the eect of dierent T on
the annual average carbon. Instead of X^n; we use its normalized version x^n to make
meaningful comparisons because it is hard to make sense of the comparison between
carbon sequestered, say, over 20 years and over 50 years, unless we take into account
the length of time. The two pines are used as an illustration because of the sharp
contrast in their sequestration paths as indicated by Figure 1.
From Tables (1a) and (1b), we can see that for loblolly pine, as T increases, the
annualized carbon decreases for all four discount rates shown,4 while for ponderosa
4At r = 0:15 for T > 60; the change in x^n is negligible. This is because r is so high that little is
added to the numerator and denominator of (5) as T increases. This is also the case for ponderosa
pine.
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pine, it rst increases and then decreases. Similarly, as r increases, for ponderosa
pine the annualized carbon decreases for all four project durations, while for loblolly
pine the relationship varies with T: The lack of a specic pattern in the change
of annualized carbon in response to the change of T (or r) can be explained by
the denition of x^n in (5). For any given r; as T increases x^n will also increase
if xn(T )   x^n (a term in dx^n=dT ) is positive. Intuitively, this implies that if the
carbon sequestration rate is higher at T or after T than the annualized sequestration
rate over [0; T ]; then as T increases, x^n becomes larger. This is the case when T
increases from 30 years to 60 or 90 years for ponderosa pine. On the other hand, if
the sequestration rate decreases over time, then the dierence of the two terms will
be negative and x^n will decrease as T increases. This is the case for loblolly pine
when T is greater than 30 years or for ponderosa pine when T increases from 90 to
160 years.
Similarly, we can explain the phenomena that, as r increases, x^n may increase for
one sequestration path but not the other and the trend even varies for the same given
path and project duration as in the case of loblolly pine. As r increases, both the
numerator,
R T
0 e
 rtxn(t)dt; and the denominator,
R T
0 e
 rtdt; in (5) will decrease. If
the former decreases more slowly (quickly) than the latter, then x^n will increase (de-
crease). That is, if
R T
0 te
 rtdt=
R T
0 e
 rtdt   R T0 te rtxn(t)dt= R T0 e rtxn(t)dt is positive
(negative), then x^n will increase (decrease). The rst ratio is essentially the average
of t weighted by e rt and the second ratio is essentially the average of t weighted by
e rtxn(t). If the rate of sequestration tends to be higher closer to time T , then the
second ratio gives relatively more weight to larger t; which implies the dierence of
the two ratios will be negative and x^n will decrease with r:
Intuitively, as r increases, the value of later sequestration will be valued even less,
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which implies lower annualized carbon if sequestration tends to occur later. This is
the case for all listed project durations for ponderosa pine, which has an increasing
rate of sequestration for a long period of time (nearly 80 years). For loblolly pine,
although sequestration starts to decline around year 20, the rate of sequestration is
still relatively high for the period between year 20 and year 30. Thus, over the period
from year 0 to year 30, more sequestration occurs relatively later, and so x^n decreases
as r increases. However, for other T values in Table (1a), more sequestration occurs
relatively earlier and so the value of x^n increases for low discount rates. At the
highest discount rate in the table (r = :15); the trend is reversed. The reason is that,
at a very large r; the value of e rt decreases rapidly and so only sequestration that
occurs really early matters. This means that the increasing trend in the early years of
loblolly pine dominates the decreasing trend later. As a result, x^n actually decreases.
By comparing the values in Tables (1a) and (1b), it is obvious that loblolly pine
has higher annualized carbon than the ponderosa pine for all T and r except for
a very low discount rate and long project duration, that is, (r = 0; T = 90); and
(r = 0; T = 160):While not shown, it is not necessarily true that, for a given T value,
high discount rates always favor one project while low discount rates favor another.
More specically, in order to compare the annualized carbon sequestration along two
dierent paths xn(t) and xm(t) for the same duration; we can assess the sign of
D(r) 
Z T
0
e rt [xn(t)  xm(t)] dt:
From the denition of x^n in (5), we know x^n   x^m  0 if and only if D(r)  0: If
we treat xn(t)  xm(t) as the net cash ow of a project, then D(r) is the net present
discounted value of this project. The discount rate r such that D(r) = 0 is called the
internal rate of return (ROR) of a project. The well-known disadvantage of ROR is
that it is not unique and that D(r) is not monotone in r: Saak and Hennessy (2001)
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and Oehmke (2000) identied conditions in which D(r) is monotone in r:
Even when the dividing discount rate such that D(r) = 0 is unique, it can
change as project duration varies. In the example of the loblolly pine and ponderosa
pine, at T = 160; the dividing discount rate is about 0:0153; that is, the PDV of
carbon sequestration by loblolly pine is larger if r > 0:0153: At T = 90; the dividing
discount rate is about 0:0074; which is smaller than that at T = 160: This is because
carbon sequestration by loblolly pine almost tapers o to zero for T > 90; while
sequestration by ponderosa pine is still signicant (see Figure 1). Thus, for a project
duration longer than 90 years, a higher discount rate is needed in order for the PDV
of carbon sequestration by loblolly pine to remain larger.
Tables 2a and 2b show the average ton-year carbon (~xn) with dierent T for
the same two pines. As T increases, ~xn shows about the same trend as x^n with
r = 0 (which is also xn, shown in the rst row in Tables (1a) and (1b)). The only
dierence is in ponderosa pine going from T = 90 to T = 160: ~xn is increasing while
xn is decreasing. This can be explained by the following dierence in the accounting
methods. As T increases, how ~xn changes depends on the balance of two eects: the
longer duration of early sequestered carbon and the carbon sequestered after T: The
rst eect is not reected in xn: If too little carbon is sequestered after T , there will
be a decreasing pressure on ~xn: If the increasing eect from the longer duration of
early sequestration cannot outweigh this decreasing eect; then ~xn decreases, as in
the case of loblolly pine for all project durations and ponderosa pine when T increases
from 90 to 160: However, if there is enough sequestration after T; combined with the
increasing eect of the increased duration of early sequestration, then this means that
~xn increases, as in the case of ponderosa pine for T = 30; 60; and 90:
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5 Implications for sequestration policies
In this section, we examine the policy implications of the accounting methods
and the factors aecting them for an important region of the United States, the Up-
per Mississippi River Basin (UMRB). The UMRB covers 492,000 square kilometers
mostly in ve states (Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Minnesota, and Wisconsin) of the cen-
tral United States. This area is comprised of 131 U.S. Geological Service (USGS)
eight-digit watersheds (shown on Figures 3-5) and is dominated by agriculture: crop-
land and pasture together account for about 67 percent of the total area. Our primary
data source is the latest available National Resource Inventory (NRI) (USDA-NRCS,
1997) which provides information on the natural resource characteristics of the land,
cropping history, and farming practices across the region. To estimate the environ-
mental benets, we use the Environmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model
version 3060.5 EPIC simulations were run for each NRI point in the region (over
40,000 points in total) for the specied project duration.
We consider a green payment type policy; that is, we assume that policymakers
pay farmers to adopt conservation practices on their elds to sequester carbon. The
conservation practice we consider here is no-till, which has been shown to have carbon
sequestration potential (Lal, et al. 1998). We assume that the goal of the policymak-
ers is to maximize the benet from carbon sequestration as specied in equation (1a)
with simplications as implied by Denitions 1-3 to account for dierent accounting
methods. With a constraint of a given total acreage of land enrolled (specically, 20
percent of the UMRB cropped area excluding pasture), it is optimal for policymakers
to pay for elds with the highest carbon sequestration potential to adopt no-till.
The alternative policy scenarios we consider dier only by the accounting mecha-
5EPIC has been tested under a variety of conditions. Additional information concerning EPIC
and details concerning model assumptions and data can be found in Feng et al. 2004.
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nism used to measure sequestration potential. For example, if sum of carbon is used,
then elds with the highest sum of carbon over the project duration will be selected
rst, regardless of these elds' sequestration potential in terms of ton-year carbon, or
the PDV of carbon. Similarly, if ton-year carbon is used, then elds will be ranked
by their sequestration potential in terms of ton-year carbon over the project duration
and the elds ranked on top will be enrolled into the program, regardless of these
elds' sum of carbon or PDV of carbon over the same period.
In the following, we present the results of some pair-wise comparisons of the
alternative accounting mechanisms.6 While these comparisons use a project duration
of 20 years, we also illustrate the eects of project duration by comparing policies
which rank elds based on 50-year and 20-year sum of carbon, respectively. For most
elds, rapid carbon sequestration occurs within the rst 20 years after switching to no
till and a new soil carbon equilibrium will be reached by the 50th year. However, there
is a large degree of heterogeneity due to the variations in crop rotation, soil, and other
natural conditions. The dierences between the policy scenarios can be illustrated in
two ways: the location of elds enrolled and the amount of carbon sequestered. To
represent the dierence in the location of land enrolled, we rst compute, for each
8-digit USGS watershed in the UMRB, the area of all elds that are only enrolled
under one policy (y1) and the area of all elds that are enrolled under both policies
(y2), and then calculate the ratio, 100  y1=y2. To illustrate the dierence between
the amount of carbon sequestered under the policy using one accounting method (y3)
and the carbon sequestered under the policy using another accounting method (y4),
we use the percentage dierence, that is, 100  (y4   y3)=y3.
Figures 3-5 display these dierences: the deeper the color the larger the dier-
6To avoid redundancy, only a few pair-wise comparisons are chosen, even though there are po-
tentially many such comparisons.
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ence. A few observations can be made based on the maps. First, in terms of either
location of land enrolled or carbon sequestered, the dierence between the accounting
methods using 20-year and 50-year annual average carbon appears to be the largest
and the dierence between ton-year accounting and PDV accounting methods the
smallest (see Figure 3 versus Figure 4). This indicates that many elds that have
relatively high annual average carbon over 20 years do not have high annual aver-
age carbon over 50 years. On the other hand, a eld that has high ton-year carbon
also tends to have high PDV of carbon over the same period, probably because both
accounting methods give more weight to early sequestration (although for dierent
reasons and in dierent ways).
Second, the dierences are larger when expressed in the form of the location of
land enrolled than in the form of carbon sequestered, as illustrated by the contrast
between maps on the left and the corresponding maps on the right in Figures 3-5.
This is mainly because (1) the dierence between the elds in terms of carbon seques-
tration potential is small, and (2) the percentage dierences are based on the same
accounting method in order to make the comparisons meaningful, even though the
policies are based on dierent accounting methods. Third, for all of the comparisons,
the dierences tend to concentrate on Iowa and southern Minnesota where most land
is enrolled. Fourth, in term of the magnitude of dierence, 73 percent (40 percent) of
the watersheds have a dierence larger than 25 percent (50 percent) in terms of the
location of elds in the comparison between the 20-year and 50-year annual average
carbon, the comparison showing the largest dierences (see Figure 3A). Interestingly,
in terms of the total sum of carbon sequestered over the whole UMRB, the dier-
ence between the policies is almost negligible (and so not presented here). It is up
to policymakers to decide in the actual design of policies (a) the importance of the
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aggregate sequestration potential, and (b) the importance of heterogeneity in terms
of geographical location.
6 Conclusions
Because of the dynamics of carbon sequestration, the accounting for time in the
estimate of carbon storage is critical in assessing sequestration projects and in com-
paring carbon sinks and other climate change mitigation options. The time dimension
of carbon sequestration is accounted for in dierent ways in the dierent account-
ing methods discussed in this paper. In analyzing sequestration options, the choice
of accounting mechanisms tends to be study specic. The annual average carbon
method and a default project duration of 20 years are currently used in IPCC's good
practice guidance on inventorying and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and re-
movals in \cropland remaining cropland" and \land converted to cropland" (Penman
et al., 2003). Given that dierent projects might be favored under dierent account-
ing mechanisms, regions/countries may advocate an accounting system that is most
suitable for their sequestration projects. For example, regions with relatively early
sequestration may advocate annualized carbon because of its preferential treatment
for early sequestration.
The quantity of carbon sequestered is not the only consequence of the use of
alternative accounting systems. In fact, in our empirical analysis, no signicant
dierence is found in terms of total amount of carbon sequestered among policies using
dierent accounting mechanisms. Instead, we nd that quite dierent geographical
areas will benet under the policies. Our results may be specic to our study region
and the sequestration activities considered. However, this points out a possibility
that governments can choose an accounting mechanism to meet other policy goals
such as income support for a certain group of people. Of course, how much freedom
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a national government has in choosing accounting methods depends on the extent of
international coordination.
Appendix: Proof for Proposition 1
Note that (t) =  e rt is an increasing function for any r > 0. Thus, if Fm(t)
FOSD Fn(t); then by (7) we haveZ T
0
( e rt)dFm(t) 
Z T
0
( e rt)dFn(t); 8 r > 0: (A-1)
Plugging in (8) and rearranging, we obtainZ T
0
e rtxm(t)R T
0 xm(s)ds
dt 
Z T
0
e rtxn(t)R T
0 xn(s)ds
dt; 8 r > 0:
Given xn = xm; we know
R T
0 xm(s)ds =
R T
0 xn(s)ds. Thus we can drop them from
both sides of the above inequality. Then, dividing both sides by
R T
0 e
 rtdt, we have
x^m  x^n; 8 r > 0:
Similarly, since (t) =  e rt is non-decreasing and concave for any r > 0; (A-1) still
holds if Fm(t) SOSD Fn(t): The second half of the proof follows in a way similar to
the proof for the rst half of Proposition 1.
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Table 1. Annualized carbon sequestration (x^n) (tons/acre/year)
7
(a) Loblolly pine (b) Ponderosa pine
T=30 T=60 T=90 T=160
r=0 3.562 2.621 1.868 1.065
r=.02 3.485 2.885 2.479 2.163
r=.05 3.333 3.083 2.979 2.948
r=.15 2.704 2.700 2.700 2.700
T=30 T=60 T=90 T=160
r=0 1.369 1.992 2.224 1.940
r=.02 1.261 1.731 1.889 1.878
r=.05 1.101 1.365 1.418 1.415
r=.15 0.694 0.713 0.713 0.713
Table 2. Average ton-year carbon (~xn) (tons/acre/year)
8
(a) Loblolly pine (b) Ponderosa pine
T=30 T=60 T=90 T=160
3.338 3.130 2.607 1.754
T=30 T=60 T=90 T=160
1.009 1.568 1.887 2.058
7For easy reference: 1 acre=0.40 hectare, 1 ton=0.91 tonne, and 1 ton/acre=2.24 tonne/hectare.
8Had we used discounting in our denition of ton-year carbon, we could obtain tables like Tables
(1a) and (1b) with similar results. Results are available from the author upon request.
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Figure 1. The path of loblolly and pondorosa pines
Figure 2. Comparison of carbon paths
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Figure 3. Project duration of 20 years vs project duration of 50 years9
A. Dierence in location of land enrolled B. Dierence in carbon sequestered
Figure 4. Ton-year carbon vs PDV of carbon accounting methods
A. Dierence in location of land enrolled B. Dierence in carbon sequestered
9In all maps, `No Data' indicates that no area is chosen in the sub-watershed.
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Figure 5. Ton-year carbon vs sum of carbon accounting methods
A. Dierence in location of land enrolled B. Dierence in carbon sequestered
25
